Technical Analysis of DarkVision RAT

Introduction

DarkVision RAT is a highly customizable remote access trojan (RAT) that first surfaced in 2020, offered on Hack Forums and their website for as little as $60. Written in C/C++, and assembly, DarkVision RAT has gained popularity due to its affordability and extensive feature set, making it accessible even to low-skilled cybercriminals. The RAT’s capabilities include keylogging, taking screenshots, file manipulation, process injection, remote code execution, and password theft. In July 2024, Zscaler ThreatLabz observed attackers using DarkVision RAT alongside PureCrypter. In this blog, we will break down the attack chain behind these DarkVision RAT infections, and provide an in-depth analysis of the RAT’s functionality, including its core features, network communication protocol, commands, and plugins.

Key Takeaways 

• In July 2024, ThreatLabz uncovered a new malware campaign distributing DarkVision RAT.
• The campaign used PureCrypter as a loader to deploy DarkVision RAT.
• DarkVision RAT communicates with its command-and-control (C2) server using a custom network protocol via sockets.
• DarkVision RAT employs various evasion and privilege escalation techniques, including DLL hijacking, auto-elevation, and process injection.
• DarkVision RAT supports a wide range of commands and plugins that enable additional capabilities such as keylogging, remote access, password theft, audio recording, and screen captures.

Technical Analysis

The following sections offer a technical analysis of an attack chain used to deploy DarkVision RAT, as well as an in-depth examination of the RAT itself.

The figure below illustrates the attack chain for the DarkVision RAT campaign discussed in this blog.

Figure 1: An example attack chain distributing DarkVision RAT as the payload in the final stage. 

First stage: Shellcode decryption in DarkVision RAT attack

The initial stage in this attack chain is a .NET executable file, protected using .NET Reactor. Upon execution of the .NET file, the first stage runs the following command:

cmd /c timeout 10

After the brief 10-second delay, the .NET file moves on to its next phase, where it decrypts the second stage shellcode.

The .NET executable uses Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) to decrypt the second stage shellcode. The key and IV are encoded in Base64 format. The Base64-encoded strings are xwmyVxHV39B5ns41HJtzRQ== for the key and SzD5abWvrRk= for the IV. The .NET executable file decodes these strings back into their original binary form. The decoded key and IV are then fed into the 3DES algorithm to decrypt the shellcode.

The decrypted shellcode is written to a block of memory that is made executable using VirtualAlloc and VirtualProtect. The .NET executable then uses the API EnumCalendarInfo’s callback function to execute the shellcode leading to the second stage.

Second stage: Donut loader

The decrypted second stage shellcode is the open source Donut loader. This x86 position-independent shellcode is designed to load .NET assemblies directly into memory. Donut loader uses the Chaskey block cipher to encrypt its modules.

We won’t be covering the specifics of Donut’s loading process, as several excellent write-ups already exist on the topic. Instead, to proceed with our analysis, we used Donut Decryptor to extract the third stage payload.

Third stage
 

Loading DarkVision RAT with PureCrypter 

The third stage of the attack chain is a .NET assembly, identified as PureCrypter, which has been previously analyzed by ThreatLabz. The main function of the PureCrypter injector starts by decompressing (gunzip) and deserializing an object into a protobuf structure, as shown in the figure below.

Figure 2: PureCrypter protobuf structure.

One of the key members in this protobuf structure is gr2pwD82LI which contains an element named Uoepndv4TW. This particular element holds the DarkVision RAT payload portable executable (PE) content, which is encrypted using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode.

Another important part of the protobuf structure is a member named IUQ99bXImZ, which contains the startup settings for DarkVision RAT.

Windows Defender exclusion and persistence tactics in PureCrypter

PureCrypter executes a PowerShell command that has been encoded in Base64 format. When decoded, this command tells PowerShell to add malicious file paths and process names used by the RAT to the list of exclusions in Windows Defender. The example below shows the PowerShell commands used to add Windows Defender exclusions for malicious file paths and process names used by DarkVision RAT.

Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath C:\yknoahdrv.exe;
Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess yknoahdrv.exe;
Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath C:\Users\REDACTED\AppData\Roaming\Siguhl.exe; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess Siguhl.exe

PureCrypter doesn't stop at evading detection as it also helps DarkVision RAT achieve persistence. PureCrypter writes the current file to %APPDATA%\Sighul.exe and adds persistence for this file as per the protobuf struct by using the Auto-run registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with the name set to Sighul. Then, according to the values in the protobuf struct, the decrypted DarkVision RAT file is injected into itself (current process), and execution is transferred to the entry point of DarkVision RAT, leading to the fourth stage.

Fourth stage: Persistence and C&C protocol

DarkVision RAT first dynamically resolves APIs using GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary. The RAT always reloads the libraries again using LoadLibrary to avoid userlands hooks placed by antivirus and endpoint detection and response (EDR) software. The API names used by the malware are stored in XOR-encoded form and are decoded using the XOR key [19 72 19 72]. DarkVision RAT also uses XOR encoding to store important strings. From here, DarkVision RAT starts to parse the command-line arguments.

Command-line parsing in DarkVision RAT

After decoding the necessary strings, DarkVision RAT starts to parse any command-line arguments. The command-line arguments used by the DarkVision RAT are Globally Unique Identifiers (GUIDs). These GUIDs serve as names in various places such as registry keys, folder names, and file names. When investigating other samples of DarkVision RAT, we noticed that these GUIDs differ from one sample to another, indicating a level of randomness in each instance of the RAT ensuring these cannot be used to create detection logic for DarkVision RAT.

Here are two GUIDs and how they were used in this sample:

• {B8B1DC5F-E2FC-41FF-A2D1-DB3800909230}:

Conditions: The action below is carried out if the user is not a local administrator and the Windows version is greater or equal to 10.

Action: Under these conditions, DarkVision RAT attempts to gain elevated privileges using a technique called DLL hijacking. DarkVision targets WinSAT.exe, a legitimate Windows process, and DXGI.DLL, a dynamic link library file to attempt auto elevation.

• {14C43BB8-A5DF-4F5D-A77A-E8BB32DEE41F}:

Conditions: The Actions below are carried out if the user is a local administrator and the Windows version is greater or equal to 10.

Action: In this scenario, DarkVision RAT adds an exclusion rule to Windows Defender to avoid detection. The RAT achieves this by running the command cmd.exe /c powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath, which tells Windows Defender to ignore the RAT file path.

Adding DarkVision RAT data to the Windows registry

DarkVision RAT creates a registry key under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\ and adds three values, each named using a hardcoded GUID. The values stored are the following:

1. RAT file content: The command opcodes 0x2BD and 0x2BE (discussed later) use this value to write the RAT file to disk.
2. RAT file path: Based on a flag, the RAT deletes the file stored in this file path. This flag is related to deleting artifacts.
3. Current system time stored in a FILETIME structure: This value is stored in a FINGERPRINT_INFO1 struct (discussed later) which is sent to the C2 server.

The figure below shows the data being added to the Windows registry.

Figure 3: DarkVision RAT data added to the Windows registry.

Persistence mechanisms leveraged by DarkVision RAT

DarkVision RAT employs three different methods to ensure persistence on an infected system. Like most of the features in DarkVision RAT, there are flags for each persistence technique, which store a boolean value that decides which persistence mechanism should be used in the sample. Since these flags are hardcoded into the binary, we concluded that they are configurable options available to the attacker when a DarkVision RAT sample is created using a builder.

The three persistence methods are as follows:

• Startup folder - In this method, DarkVision RAT creates a batch script that contains a command to execute the RAT executable. After creating this script, DarkVision RAT then creates a shortcut to the batch script and places this shortcut in the Windows startup folder.

• Autorun keys - Another method DarkVision RAT leverages is autorun keys. DarkVision RAT adds an entry that points to its executable file in one of the autorun keys located at Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. The exact location of this key can be under either HKEY_CURRENT_USER (for the current user) or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (for the system), depending on the flags set within the RAT. 

• Task Scheduler - DarkVision RAT uses the ITaskService COM interface to schedule a task to execute the malware.

After setting up persistence mechanisms, DarkVision RAT checks if it is currently running from a specific location, namely %APPDATA%\photos\System.exe (we refer to %APPDATA%\photos as the RAT folder and the full path as the RAT file path moving forward as this path varies across samples).

If DarkVision RAT is not running from this designated folder, it copies itself to this path and then uses the newly copied file to create a child process. This ensures that the RAT is running from a consistent and expected location.

Next, the RAT creates a new folder in C:\ProgramData, which we refer to as the plugin parent folder. This folder is used to store additional encrypted plugins in its subdirectories (discussed later).

Process injection techniques employed by DarkVision RAT

DarkVision RAT uses the NtCreateSection and NtMapViewOfSection APIs to perform process injection, which is used in multiple places to perform RAT functionalities. DarkVision RAT creates a remote process in a suspended state. The RAT then creates a new memory section, mapping one view of this section to the local process and another view to the remote target process. The view mapped in the local process is populated with a function that the RAT needs to execute. This process is repeated to fill the structure used by the function in another mapped view. The thread context of the remote process is then modified: the Instruction Pointer (RIP/EIP) is set to the function's address, and the first parameter (RCX/ESP+4) is set to the address of the structure. Finally, the thread is resumed, leading to the execution of the function.

DarkVision RAT communication protocol

Once executed, DarkVision RAT needs to connect to the C2 server to receive instructions and respond with information. The C2 communications use a custom binary protocol. Based on the flags set, the C2 address is parsed in one of two different ways:

• Retrieve the C2 information: The RAT utilizes WinHTTP libraries to connect to a URL stored in plain text. The returned data contains the C2 information in the format c2address:port.
• Hardcoded C2 Information: The C2 address and port are stored in plain text within the binary. For example, the C2 address embedded in the binary analyzed by ThreatLabz was severdops.ddns[.]net:8120.

Registration

The first action DarkVision RAT takes is to register itself with the C2 server by sending a unique Bot ID. To create this Bot ID, the RAT generates a random GUID and combines it with an MD5 hash of the Unicode string "P@55w0rd!". This string, "P@55w0rd!", is stored in plain text within the RAT’s code and varies across different samples.

Receiving the acknowledgment (ACK) packet 

After sending its unique ID, DarkVision RAT waits for a response from the C2 server. The server replies with a specific data packet { 01 00 00 00 }. The received data is compared to the value 1, and the RAT will only proceed with sending the next data if this comparison is successful. This packet functions similarly to an ACK packet in the TCP protocol, so we will refer to it as an “ACK packet” moving forward. The RAT client then sends the data { 00 00 00 00 }, to which the server responds with an ACK packet. 

The figure below shows the network communication between a system infected with DarkVision RAT and the C2 server.

Figure 4: Network communication between a system infected with DarkVision RAT and the C2 server.

Device fingerprinting

The RAT client then performs device fingerprinting and collects system information. This information is sent in two packets. Before each packet, the size of the structure is sent, followed by the structure containing the system information. After receiving the first structure, the server sends an ACK packet. Upon receiving the second structure, the C2 server sends two ACK packets. The two structures sent are shown below.

struct FINGERPRINT_INFO1{
 uint32_t hardcoded_value;           // set to 0x10017
 wchar_t botnet_name[40];            // set to AppleX
 int32_t is_localadmin;              // TRUE = 1 , FALSE = 0
 wchar_t pname_followedby_pid[260];  // RAT process name followed by pid %s [%d]
 uint32_t hardcoded_value2;          // set to 0x40
 FILETIME system_time;               // current system time
};

struct FINGERPRINT_INFO2{
 uint32_t geocode;            // geocode of the victim country 
 wchar_t computer_name[16];   // victim computer name
 wchar_t user_name[258];      // victim username
 uint32_t system_ip[54];      // victim h_addr_list in network byte order
 int64_t system_uptime;       // victim system uptime in milliseconds
 ULONG os_info[4];            // victim os info
};

DarkVision RAT then creates a new socket and sends its unique bot ID to the server. The server responds with an ACK packet. The client then sends an ACK packet in return, and the server replies with another ACK packet. After this exchange, the RAT client waits for commands from the C2 server.

Commands supported by DarkVision RAT

The command's opcode, function address, and other related data are stored as an array of 12 elements (12 commands). Each element is a struct of size 0x28, which we will refer to as a COMMAND_STRUCT. If the opcode matches the data received from the server, the corresponding func_address is executed by creating a thread. The COMMAND_STRUCT is shown below.

struct COMMAND_STRUCT{
 uint64_t opcode;        // opcode of the command 
 uint64_t event_handle;  // handle of event created when the command is run
 uint64_t thread_handle; // handle of thread created which executes func_address
 void *func_address;     // address of the function to be executed
 uint64_t socket;        // socket descriptor of the socket
};

The table below lists the commands supported by DarkVision RAT.

Table 1: Commands implemented by DarkVision RAT.

There is another set of commands used to execute plugin ordinals. For all previously mentioned commands, the upper 16 bits are set to 0, and the lower 16 bits contain the opcode ID of the command to be executed. In the next set of commands, the upper 16 bits contain the plugin ID to be executed, while the lower 16 bits contain the ordinal number to be executed.

Plugins available in DarkVision RAT

Most of the DarkVision RAT's features are implemented through plugins. These plugins remain as plain text only in memory, while they are stored as encrypted data on disk and in the registry. When a plugin is loaded, ordinal 0x65 of the plugin is executed using a thread. The thread takes a struct as an argument, which contains important information about the plugin. Below is the structure used for this purpose.

struct PLUGIN_STRUCT{
 wchar_t plugin_parent_folder[0x8000]; // folder containing all plugin sub folders
 wchar_t plugin_filename[0x8000];      // plugin file name
 wchar_t plugin_filepath[0x8000];      // plugin file path
 void *plugin_base_address;            // plugin base address in memory
 int32_t plugin_size;                  // size of plugin
 void *rat_folder;                     // RAT folder
 void *plugin_array;                   // array containing all plugin id's
};

The plugins are executed in the same manner as the initial set of commands. The table below shows the plugin ID and its description.

Table 2: Plugins loaded by DarkVision RAT.

Conclusion

In conclusion, DarkVision RAT represents a potent and versatile tool for cybercriminals, offering a wide array of malicious capabilities, from keylogging and screen capture to password theft and remote execution. This versatility, combined with its low cost and availability on Hack Forums and their website, has made DarkVision RAT increasingly popular among attackers. The recent campaign uncovered by ThreatLabz, where DarkVision RAT is paired with PureCrypter, showcases how threat actors leverage malware families together to bypass security software. By shedding light on the inner workings of DarkVision RAT, this analysis aims to equip security teams with the insights they need to defend against these evolving threats. 

The Zscaler Cloud Sandbox has consistently detected this campaign with high accuracy. Zscaler ThreatLabz will continue to monitor and track both PureCrypter and DarkVision RAT, sharing any new findings with the wider security community.

Zscaler Coverage 

Zscaler’s multilayered cloud security platform detects indicators related to DarkVision RAT at various levels. The figure below depicts the Zscaler Cloud Sandbox, showing detection details for DarkVision RAT.

Figure 5: Zscaler sandbox report for the DarkVision RAT sample.

In addition to sandbox detections, Zscaler’s multilayered cloud security platform detects indicators related to this campaign at various levels with the following threat names: 

• Win32.RAT.DarkVision
• Win32.Downloader.PureCrypter
• Win32.Trojan.Donut

Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs) 

Host Indicators

Network Indicators

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques